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This book uses conceptual metaphor theory to explore moral metaphors in English and Chinese. Ning Yu sheds light on the metaphorical nature of moral cognition and how it is systematically manifested in language, and explores the potential commonalities that define moral cognition and the differences that characterize distinct cultures.
This book investigates moral metaphors in English and Chinese, applying conceptual metaphor theory to a comparative study of the linguistic manifestation of the moral metaphor system rooted in the domains of bodily and physical experience. Ning Yu sheds light on the metaphorical nature of moral cognition and how it is systematically manifested in language, and explores the potential commonalities that define moral cognition in general, as well as the differences that characterize distinct cultures. The work investigates moral cognition at the cultural level as reflected in language, based on linguistic evidence from both English and Chinese and, to a limited extent, multimodal evidence from the corresponding cultures. The moral metaphor system is taken to consist of three major subsystems, referred to as "physical", "visual", and "spatial". These subsystems are clusters of conceptual metaphors, whose source concepts are from domains of embodied experiences in the physical world, and which are formulated in contrastive categories with bipolar values for the target concepts of moral and immoral. The study is characterized by two keywords: system and systematicity: The former refers to the fact that metaphors (conceptual and linguistic) are connected within networks, and the latter to the need for those metaphors to be studied in such networks.
What are human beings like? How is knowledge possible? What is truth? Where do moral values come from? Questions like these have stood at the center of Western philosophy for centuries. In addressing them, philosophers have made certain fundamental assumptions-that we can know our own minds by introspection, that most of our thinking about the world is literal, and that reason is disembodied and universal-that are now called into question by well-established results of cognitive science. It has been shown empirically that:Most thought is unconscious. We have no direct conscious access to the mechanisms of thought and language. Our ideas go by too quickly and at too deep a level for us to observe them in any simple way.Abstract concepts are mostly metaphorical. Much of the subject matter of philosopy, such as the nature of time, morality, causation, the mind, and the self, relies heavily on basic metaphors derived from bodily experience. What is literal in our reasoning about such concepts is minimal and conceptually impoverished. All the richness comes from metaphor. For instance, we have two mutually incompatible metaphors for time, both of which represent it as movement through space: in one it is a flow past us and in the other a spatial dimension we move along.Mind is embodied. Thought requires a body-not in the trivial sense that you need a physical brain to think with, but in the profound sense that the very structure of our thoughts comes from the nature of the body. Nearly all of our unconscious metaphors are based on common bodily experiences.Most of the central themes of the Western philosophical tradition are called into question by these findings. The Cartesian person, with a mind wholly separate from the body, does not exist. The Kantian person, capable of moral action according to the dictates of a universal reason, does not exist. The phenomenological person, capable of knowing his or her mind entirely through introspection alone, does not exist. The utilitarian person, the Chomskian person, the poststructuralist person, the computational person, and the person defined by analytic philosopy all do not exist.Then what does?Lakoff and Johnson show that a philosopy responsible to the science of mind offers radically new and detailed understandings of what a person is. After first describing the philosophical stance that must follow from taking cognitive science seriously, they re-examine the basic concepts of the mind, time, causation, morality, and the self: then they rethink a host of philosophical traditions, from the classical Greeks through Kantian morality through modern analytic philosopy. They reveal the metaphorical structure underlying each mode of thought and show how the metaphysics of each theory flows from its metaphors. Finally, they take on two major issues of twentieth-century philosopy: how we conceive rationality, and how we conceive language.
Inspired by the Rhetoric Culture Project, this volume focuses on the use of imagery, narrative, and cultural schemes to deal with predicaments that arise during the course of life. The contributors explore how people muster their resources to understand and deal with emergencies such as illness, displacement, or genocide. In dealing with such circumstances, people can develop new rhetorical forms and, in the process, establish new cultural resources for succeeding generations. Several of the contributions show how rhetorical cultural forms can themselves create emergencies. The contributors bring expertise from a variety of disciplines, including anthropology and communications studies, underlining the volume's wider relevance as a reflection on the human condition.
The Enlightenment idea that reason creates fixed moral rules that specify "the right thing to do" is mistaken, according to Johnson, because it misses the ways in which human conceptual systems are grounded in bodily experience, and it ignores the expansive and constructive nature of our best moral thinking. Since new findings in cognitive science explain reasoning in terms of prototypes, frame semantics, metaphor, and basic-level experience, Johnson contends that we must revise our views of ethics and adopt an alternative conception of moral reflection - one that is thoroughly imaginative.
Human Rights and the Body is a response to the crisis in human rights, to the very real concern that without a secure foundation for the concept of human rights, their very existence is threatened. While there has been consideration of the discourses of human rights and the way in which the body is written upon, research in linguistics has not yet been fully brought to bear on either human rights or the body. Drawing on legal concepts and aspects of the law of human rights, Mooney aims to provide a universally defensible set of human rights and a foundation, or rather a frame, for them. She argues that the proper frames for human rights are firstly the human body, seen as an index reliant on the natural world, secondly the globe and finally, language. These three frames generate rights to food, water, sleep and shelter, environmental protection and a right against dehumanization. This book is essential reading for researchers and graduate students in the fields of human rights and semiotics of law.
Together with its sister volume on Descriptive Cognitive Approaches, this volume explores the contribution which cognitive linguistics can make to the identification and analysis of overt and hidden ideologies. As a theory of language which sees language as the accumulation of the conventionalised conceptualisations of a given linguistic and/or cultural community or sub-group within it, cognitive linguistics is called upon to make its own inroads in the study of ideology. This volume offers theoretical approaches and first discusses the philosophical foundations of cognitive linguistics. The question whether cognitive linguistics is not an ideology itself is not tabooed. The speaker’s deictic centre is the anchoring point, not only for spatial, temporal or interactional deixis, but also for cultural and ideological deixis. Cognitive linguistics is also confronted with a severe Marxist critique, but the potential convergence between the two ‘philosophies’ is highlighted as well. Further the question is raised to what extent the central nervous system and the grammatical system of a language impose sexually biased, and hence ideological representations on cognition. Finally, linguistics itself is seen as a potential bearer of ideological deviations as was the case with the ‘politics of linguistics’ in Nazi Germany, and even with the quest for the Indo-European homeland in comparative and historical linguistics throughout the 19th century and well into the 20th century.
In Where Metaphors Come From, Zoltán Kövecses proposes a metaphorical grounding that augments and refines conceptual metaphor theory according to which conceptual metaphors are based on our bodily experience. While this is certainly true in many cases of metaphor, the role of the body in metaphor creation can and should be reinterpreted, and, consequently, the body can be seen as just one of the several contexts from which metaphors can emerge (including the situational, discourse, and conceptual-cognitive contexts) - although perhaps the dominant or crucial one. Kövecses is a leader in CMT, and his argument in this book is more in line with what has been discovered about the nature of human cognition in recent years; namely, that human cognition is grounded in experience in multiple ways - embodiment, in a strict sense, being just one of them (see Barsalou, 2008; Gibbs, 2006; Pecher and Zwaan, 2005). In light of the present work, this is because cognition, including metaphorical cognition, is grounded in not only the body, but also in the situations in which people act and lead their lives, the discourses in which they are engaged at any time in communicating and interacting with each other, and the conceptual knowledge they have accumulated about the world in the course of their experience of it.
