PDF The Evolution of Operational Art Download
- Author: G. S. Isserson
- Publisher:
- ISBN: 9780989137232
- Category : Military art and science
- Languages : en
- Pages : 111
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Broadly defined as the grey area between strategy and tactics, operational art spans the theory and practice of planning and conducting campaigns and major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives in a given theatre of operations. An intermediate link between strategy and tactics has always existed, but a distinct concept that encompasses a systematic and deliberate plan of campaign for major operations is a mere two hundred years old. Based on country specific case-studies, this book describes how the concepts that underpin operational art originated, how they received practical expression in various campaigns, and how they developed over time. The point of departure is the campaigns of 'the God of War', Napoleon Bonaparte. The book then proceeds with chapters on the evolution of operational art in Prussia / Germany, the Soviet Union / Russia, the United Kingdom, United States, Israel, and China. The final chapter deals with the future of operational art in irregular warfare. Theory is critical to refining and improving existing methods of applying operational warfare, and its importance cannot be overstated; however, to be useful, theory and its accompanying vocabulary must be combined with a proper examination of historical trends and practical experience. The present volume attempts to achieve that combination. This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War.
This book offers a scientific interpretation of the field of military knowledge situated between strategy and tactics, better known as operational art', and traces the evolution of operational awareness and its culmination in a full-fledged theory. The author, a Brigadier General (ret.) in the Israeli Defence Forces and Doctor of History, King's College, London, clarifies the substance of operational art' and constructs a cognitive framework for its critical analysis. He chronicles the stages in the evolution of operational theory from the emergence of 19th-century military thought to Blitzkrieg. For the first time the Soviet theories of Deep Operations' and Strike Manoeuvre' that emerged in the 1920s and 1930 are discussed. The author argues that it is these doctrines that eventually led to the crystallization of the American Airland Battle theory, successfully implemented in the Gulf War.
NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT--OVERSTOCK SALE -- Significantly reduced list price while supplies last Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art, a companion volume to Clayton R. Newell's and Michael D. Krause's On Operational Art, captures the doctrinal debate over the evolving concept of operational art-the critical link between strategy and tactics-in the face of the new complexities of warfare and the demands of irregular operations in the twenty-first century. Consisting of fifteen original essays selected and edited by Michael D. Krause in collaboration with R. Cody Phillips, the well-organized anthology presents the collective view of distinguished military historians and scholars that operational art must be adjusted to accommodate the changing circumstances happening around the world, especially when dealing with broad coalitions and alliances in regional environments and at an international level. Related products: The Rise of iWar: Identity, Information, and the Individualization of Modern Warfare can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01198-2 Yemen: A Different Political Paradigm in Context can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-070-00865-3 A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines 1901-1902 is avaialble here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01000-5 Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01061-7
One can argue that the development of true doctrine required the formal adoption of the concept of operational art. Prior to the Great War, no army in the world possessed a codified body of thought that enabled senior military commanders to visualize the aggregate effects of tactical engagements across time and space. By 1918, after a dramatic revision of drill regulations into something approaching true doctrine, the German army was furthest in realizing this goal. Ultimately, though, the Germans could not translate tactical success into strategic victory because they could not resource military operations in sufficient depth to render local successes decisive. Understanding that the character of warfare in 1918 was radically different from 1914 would have enabled Ludendorff to see the flaws in the MICHAEL offensives and perhaps mitigate them. And although the interwar German Army spent a great deal of effort reflecting on the lessons of 1914-1918, German understanding of the operational art remained incomplete. The separate and unequal Allied efforts against Nazi Germany in World War II, followed immediately by the superpower competition of the Cold War, created a significant gap in American officers' understand ing of the factors that contributed to Soviet victories on the Eastern Front. As a result, in the decades following the war the concept of "operational art" was recognized and adopted by the US Army almost as a proprietary creation. In the 1990s, however, Western military historians and theorists discovered that the Soviets had gotten there first. Bruce Menning's translation of Georgii Samoilovich Isserson's 1936 treatise The Evolution of Operational Art is the best example available of the distillation of Soviet military thought before the Second World War. Isserson, Tukhachevsky, Shaposhnikov, and others like them were founding members of a focused military Enlightenment whose goal was to change the way armies and leaders thought about war. Moreover, unlike contemporaries such as B.H. Liddell Hart or Billy Mitchell, they had the opportunity to build their ideas into the modem Soviet Army and see their doctrine survive despite the existential challenges of Stalin's purges and the German invasion.
From the foreword: "Bruce Menning's translation of Georgii Samoilovich Isserson's 1936 treatise The Evolution of Operational Art is the best example available of the distillation of Soviet military thought before the Second World War. Isserson, Tukhachevsky, Shaposhnikov, and others like them were founding members of a focused military Enlightenment whose goal was to change the way armies and leaders thought about war. Moreover, unlike contemporaries such as B.H. Liddell Hart or Billy Mitchell, they had the opportunity to build their ideas into the modern Soviet Army and see their doctrine survive despite the existential challenges of Stalin's purges and the German invasion. I commend this work to you as a foundational text, one to which I hope you will refer repeatedly throughout your career."
From the foreword: "Bruce Menning's translation of Georgii Samoilovich Isserson's 1936 treatise The Evolution of Operational Art is the best example available of the distillation of Soviet military thought before the Second World War. Isserson, Tukhachevsky, Shaposhnikov, and others like them were founding members of a focused military Enlightenment whose goal was to change the way armies and leaders thought about war. Moreover, unlike contemporaries such as B.H. Liddell Hart or Billy Mitchell, they had the opportunity to build their ideas into the modern Soviet Army and see their doctrine survive despite the existential challenges of Stalin's purges and the German invasion. I commend this work to you as a foundational text, one to which I hope you will refer repeatedly throughout your career."
This collection of texts has been taken from formerly classified material in the official Red Army General Staff journal 'Military Thought'. The results are two volumes of great scope based on archival evidence. They stand as a compulsory reference point for anyone with an interest in the operational endeavours of the Soviet Army from the 1920's onward.