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This introduction, first published in 2005, considers the philosophical and literary aspects of Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' and shows how they are related.
The collection explores Wittgenstein’s early work, with a particular focus on his Tractatus, which examines the relation between language and the world, and which makes the distinction between saying and showing. The book considers the topics of logic, ontology, metaphysics, and the epistemological and moral aspects of Tractatus.
This historical study investigates Ludwig Wittgenstein's early philosophy of logic and language, as it is presented in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The study makes a case for the Tractatus as an insightful critique of the philosophies of Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege-the Founding Fathers of analytic philosophy.
Recent years have seen a great revival of interest in Wittgenstein's early masterpiece, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The Enchantment of Words is a study of that book, offering novel readings of all its major themes and shedding light on issues in metaphysics, ethics and the philosophies of mind, language, and logic. McManus argues that Wittgenstein's aim in this deeply puzzling work is to show that the 'intelligibility of thought' and the 'meaningfulness of language', which logical truths would delimit and metaphysics and the philosophy of mind and language would explain, are issues constituted by confusions. What is exposed is a mirage of a kind of self-consciousness, a misperception of the ways in which we happen to think, talk and act as reasons why we ought to think, talk and act as we do. The root of that misperception is our confusedly endowing words with a life of their own: we 'enchant', and are 'enchanted by', words, colluding in a confusion that transposes on to them, and the world which we then see them as 'fitting', responsibilities that are actually ours to bear. Such words promise to spare us the trouble, not only of thinking, but of living. In presenting this view, McManus offers readings of all of the major themes of the Tractatus, including its discussion of logical truth, objects, names, inference, subjectivity, solipsism and the ineffable; McManus offers novel explanations of what is at stake in Wittgenstein's comparison of propositions with pictures, of why Wittgenstein declared the point of the Tractatus to be ethical, of how a bookwhich infamously declares itself to be nonsensical can both clarify our thoughts and require of us that we exercise our capacity to reason in reading it, and of how Wittgenstein later came to re-evaluate the achievement of the Tractatus.
Pulling up the Ladder discusses how Wittgenstein's early philosophy became widely known largely through the efforts of Russell and other empirically-minded British philosophers, and to a lesser extent, the scientifically-oriented German-speaking philosophers of the Vienna Circle. However, Wittgenstein's primary philosophical concerns arose in a far different context, and failure to grasp this has led to many misunderstandings of the Tractatus. From Brockhaus' investigation of that context and its problems emerges this new interpretation of Wittgenstein's early thought, which also affords fresh insights into the later Wittgenstein.
Alfred Nordmann's introduction considers both the philosophical and the literary aspects of the Tractatus and demonstrates how they are related. It also reveals how the work fits into Wittgenstein's philosophical development and the tradition of analytic philosophy, arguing strongly for the vigor and significance of that tradition.
This book presents both a new translation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus (often similar to Ogden's, but with significant improvements) and a line-by-line guide to relevant secondary literature. Rather than arguing for any particular interpretation, it presents a variety of positions for the reader to consider.
José L. Zalabardo puts forward a new interpretation of central ideas in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus concerning the structure of reality and our representations of it in thought and language. He shows the origins of Wittgenstein's picture theory of propositional representation in Russell's theories of judgment, arguing that the picture theory is Wittgenstein's solution to some of the problems that he found in Russell's position. Zalabardo defends the view that, for Wittgenstein, facts in general, and the facts that play the role of propositions in particular, are not composite items, arising from the combination of their constituents. They are ultimate, irreducible units, and what we think of as their constituents are features that facts have in common with one another. These common features have built into them their possibilities of combination with other features into possible situations. This is the source of the Tractarian account of non-actual possibilities. It is also the source of the idea that it is not possible to produce propositions answering to certain descriptions, including those that would give rise to Russell's paradox. Zalabardo then considers Wittgenstein's view that every proposition is a truth function of elementary propositions. He argues that this view is motivated by Wittgenstein's epistemology of logic, according to which we should be able to see logical relations by inspecting the structures of propositions. Finally, Zalabardo considers the problems that we face if we try to extend the application of the picture theory from elementary propositions to truth functions of these.
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s brief Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) is one of the most important philosophical works of the twentieth century, yet it offers little orientation for the reader. The first-time reader is left wondering what it could be about, and the scholar is left with little guidance for interpretation. In Tractatus in Context, James C. Klagge presents the vital background necessary for appreciating Wittgenstein’s gnomic masterpiece. Tractatus in Context contains the early reactions to the Tractatus, including the initial reviews written in 1922-1924. And while we can’t talk with Wittgenstein, we can do the next best thing—hear what he had to say about the Tractatus. Klagge thus presents what Wittgenstein thought about germane issues leading up to his writing the book, in discussions and correspondence with others about his ideas, and what he had to say about the Tractatus after it was written—in letters, lectures and conversations. It offers, you might say, Wittgenstein’s own commentary on the book. Key Features: Illuminates what is at stake in the Tractatus, by providing the views of others that engaged Wittgenstein as he was writing it. Includes Wittgenstein’s earlier thoughts on ideas in the book as recorded in his notebooks, letters, and conversations as well as his later, retrospective comments on those ideas. Draws on new or little-known sources, such as Wittgenstein’s coded notebooks, Hermine’s notes, Frege’s letters, Hänsel’s diary, Ramsey’s notes, and Skinner’s dictations. Draws connections between the background context and specific passages in the Tractatus, using a proposition-by-proposition commentary.
