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Nineteen distinguished philosophers, including four Lakatos award winners, address various aspects of Peter Achinstein's influential views on the nature of scientific evidence, explanation, and realism -- with replies from Achinstein himself.
When Galileo dropped cannon-balls from the top of the Leaning Tower of Pisa, he did more than overturn centuries of scientific orthodoxy. At a stroke, he established a new conception of the scientific method based upon careful experimentation and rigorous observation - and also laid the groundwork for an ongoing conflict between the critical open-mindedness of science and the recalcitrant dogmatism of religion that would continue to the modern day. The problem is that Galileo never performed his most celebrated experiment in Pisa. In fact, he rarely conducted any experiments at all. The Church publicly celebrated his work, and Galileo enjoyed patronage from the great and the powerful; his ecclesiastical difficulties only began when disgruntled colleagues launched a campaign to discredit their academic rival. But what does this tell us about modern science if its own foundation myth turns out to be nothing more than political propaganda? Getting Science Wrong discusses some of the most popular misconceptions about science, and their continuing role in the public imagination. Drawing upon the history and philosophy of science it challenges wide-spread assumptions and misunderstandings, from creationism and climate change to the use of statistics and computer modelling. The result is an engaging introduction to contentious issues in the philosophy of science and a new way of looking at the role of science in society.
Scientists use concepts and principles that are partly specific for their subject matter, but they also share part of them with colleagues working in different fields. Compare the biological notion of a 'natural kind' with the general notion of 'confirmation' of a hypothesis by certain evidence. Or compare the physical principle of the 'conservation of energy' and the general principle of 'the unity of science'. Scientists agree that all such notions and principles aren't as crystal clear as one might wish. An important task of the philosophy of the special sciences, such as philosophy of physics, of biology and of economics, to mention only a few of the many flourishing examples, is the clarification of such subject specific concepts and principles. Similarly, an important task of 'general' philosophy of science is the clarification of concepts like 'confirmation' and principles like 'the unity of science'. It is evident that clarfication of concepts and principles only makes sense if one tries to do justice, as much as possible, to the actual use of these notions by scientists, without however following this use slavishly. That is, occasionally a philosopher may have good reasons for suggesting to scientists that they should deviate from a standard use. Frequently, this amounts to a plea for differentiation in order to stop debates at cross-purposes due to the conflation of different meanings. While the special volumes of the series of Handbooks of the Philosophy of Science address topics relative to a specific discipline, this general volume deals with focal issues of a general nature. After an editorial introduction about the dominant method of clarifying concepts and principles in philosophy of science, called explication, the first five chapters deal with the following subjects. Laws, theories, and research programs as units of empirical knowledge (Theo Kuipers), various past and contemporary perspectives on explanation (Stathis Psillos), the evaluation of theories in terms of their virtues (Ilkka Niiniluto), and the role of experiments in the natural sciences, notably physics and biology (Allan Franklin), and their role in the social sciences, notably economics (Wenceslao Gonzalez). In the subsequent three chapters there is even more attention to various positions and methods that philosophers of science and scientists may favor: ontological, epistemological, and methodological positions (James Ladyman), reduction, integration, and the unity of science as aims in the sciences and the humanities (William Bechtel and Andrew Hamilton), and logical, historical and computational approaches to the philosophy of science (Atocha Aliseda and Donald Gillies). The volume concludes with the much debated question of demarcating science from nonscience (Martin Mahner) and the rich European-American history of the philosophy of science in the 20th century (Friedrich Stadler). Comprehensive coverage of the philosophy of science written by leading philosophers in this field Clear style of writing for an interdisciplinary audience No specific pre-knowledge required
Few can imagine a world without telephones or televisions; many depend on computers and the Internet as part of daily life. Without scientific theory, these developments would not have been possible. In this exceptionally clear and engaging introduction to philosophy of science, James Ladyman explores the philosophical questions that arise when we reflect on the nature of the scientific method and the knowledge it produces. He discusses whether fundamental philosophical questions about knowledge and reality might be answered by science, and considers in detail the debate between realists and antirealists about the extent of scientific knowledge. Along the way, central topics in philosophy of science, such as the demarcation of science from non-science, induction, confirmation and falsification, the relationship between theory and observation and relativism are all addressed. Important and complex current debates over underdetermination, inference to the best explaination and the implications of radical theory change are clarified and clearly explained for those new to the subject.
"In this new edition Samir Ikasha reviews the main themes of contemporary philosophy of science. Beginning with a brief account of the history of modern science, he asks whether there is a discernible pattern to the way scientific ideas change over time. He examines scientific inference, scientific explanation, and the debate between realist and anti-realist views of science."--
A clear and engaging introduction to the philosophy of science, exploring the role of science within the broader framework of human knowledge and engagement with the world What are the central features and advantages of a scientific worldview? Why do even reasonable scientists sometimes disagree with each other? How are scientific methods different than those of other disciplines? Can science provide an objective account of reality? This is Philosophy of Science introduces the most important philosophical issues that arise within the empirical sciences. Requiring no previous background in philosophy, this reader-friendly volume covers topics ranging from traditional questions about the nature of explanation and the confirmation of theories to practical issues concerning the design of physical experiments and modeling. Incisive and accessible chapters with relevant case-studies and informative illustrations examine the function of thought experiments, discuss the realism/anti-realism debate, explore probability and theory testing, and address more challenging topics such as emergentism, measurement theory, and the manipulationist account of causation. Describes key philosophical concepts and their application in the empirical sciences Highlights past and present philosophical debates within the field Features numerous illustrations, real-world examples, and references to additional resources Includes a companion website with self-assessment exercises and instructor-only test banks Part of Wiley-Blackwell’s popular This Is Philosophy series, This is Philosophy of Science: An Introduction is an excellent textbook for STEM students with interest in the conceptual foundations of their disciplines, undergraduate philosophy majors, and general readers looking for an easy-to-read overview of the subject.
Currents such as epistemological and social constructivism, postmodernism, and certain forms of multiculturalism that had become fashionable within science education circles in the last decades lost sight of critical inquiry as the core aim of education. In this book we develop an account of education that places critical inquiry at the core of education in general and science education in particular. Since science constitutes the paradigm example of critical inquiry, we explain the nature of science, paying particular attention to scientific methodology and scientific modeling and at the same time showing their relevance in the science classroom. We defend a universalist, rationalist, and objectivist account of science against epistemological and social constructivist views, postmodernist approaches and epistemic multiculturalist accounts.
