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What exactly are the reasons we do things, and how are they related to the resulting actions? Bittner explores this question and proposes an answer: a reason is a response to that state of affairs. Elegantly written, this work is a substantial contribution to the fields of rationality, ethics, and action theory.
"The book is to show that the aim of thinking about what to do, of practical reason, is to find, not what we ought to do, but what is a good thing to do for us under the circumstances. So it argues, first, that neither under prudence nor under morality there are things we ought to do. There is no warrant for the idea of our being required, by natural law perhaps or by our rationality, to do either what helps us attain our ends or what is right for moral reasons. While common moral understanding is committed to there being things we ought to do and to our being guilty and deserving blame if we fail to do them, we can lay aside these notions without loss, indeed with benefit. Second, it explains what it is for something to be good for somebody to do under the circumstances and argues for understanding practical reason in these terms. What is good for somebody to do we find by experience: from what we go through we learn what helps and what hinders and figure out on this basis both what is prudentially useful and what is morally right to do - although in the end this difference itself gives way, and morality turns out to be a part of prudence"--
People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do. Fred Schueler seeks to replace such causal views, arguing that they leave out two essential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherently normative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept.
Moments of Soul is a philosophical inquiry into four distinctive powers of humanity: free choice, personal identity, honor, and faith. The theme through all four powers is the paradox of soul as the power of attraction between persons, not the hidden attribute of an individual. While the inquiry aims to develop our powers of mutual attraction, it exposes some common mistakes of our times, such as reducing mind to brain function, mixing personal identity with ethnic pride, and confusing faith with religious belief. The method is to avoid making images or analogies in order to state clear problems and find their solutions.
Man kann die Vielfalt und Dynamik der gegenwärtigen Analytischen Philosophie kaum besser unter Beweis stellen als durch sachorientierte Streitgespräche zwischen ihren herausragenden Vertretern. Die Kolloquien der GAP.5-Konferenz waren solche Streitgespräche. In ihnen haben international renommierte Philosophinnen und Philosophen über aktuelle Fragen aus dem Spektrum der Analytischen Philosophie debattiert - von Willensfreiheit bis Wohlfahrt und Armut, von Bedeutung und Normativität bis Feministische Wissenschaftstheorie, von Philosophie als Wissenschaft? bis Physikalismus. Mit Beiträgen von: Daniela Bailer-Jones, Paul A. Boghossian, Ansgar Beckermann, Jonathan Dancy, Hans-Johann Glock, Jane Heal, Frank Jackson, Pierre Jacob, Janet A. Kourany, Brian P. McLaughlin, Margaret Morrison, Jan Narveson, Julian Nida-Rümelin, Cassandra L. Pinnick, Wolfgang Prinz, Michael Ruse, Ludwig Siep, Wolfgang Spohn, Larry Temkin und Holm Tetens.
